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Abstract 
In this research work, author focuses on the analysis of the theory of foreign trade policy and important political and 
economic interests. Realistic point is important trends in the trade regime. The decisions taken by the representatives of 
the governments participating in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are, to a significant degree, influenced by various 
lobbies, such as organisations and unions of food producers or other non-governmental organisations, including trade 
unions. The main objective of the research task is to give a comprehensive analysis of the international trade policy. The 
particularly main concern the political economy models of foreign trade policy, protectionistic pressures in different 
political system, the level of protectionistic pressures, food producer pressures, international trade liberalization and 
environmental protection, bilateral tendencies in the foreign trade policy. It must be emphasis that on a theoretical level, 
understanding the choice of trade policies between liberalizm and protectionisme is very important. Despite the 
undeniable benefits of the multilateral WTO forum for trade liberalisation, the rapid increase of North-South bilateral and 
multilateral Free Trade Areas (FTAs) begs a systematic explanation for why some forums are prioritized relative to 
others.  
Keywords: foreign trade policy, economic interests, protectionistic pressures, level of protectionistic pressures, bilateral 
tendencies 
1. Introduction 
Different positions of the member states of the World Trade Organization (WTO) especially developed and developing 
countries and also USA, the European Union and Japan representatives were observed during the Doha Round of trade 
negotiations under the WTO. The problems of agriculture protection in the developed countries for example in European 
Union and USA and also in the developing countries, were becoming a serious obstacle during the negotiations. The 
decisions taken by the representatives of the governments participating in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are, to a 
significant degree, influenced by various lobbies, such as organisations and unions of food producers or other 
non-governmental organisations, including trade unions. The problems of mutual relations between the representatives of 
governments and those non-governmental organisations which influence on multilateral trade negotiations conducted on 
the forum of WTO are also the subject of the analysis in the undertaken research program. Despite the undeniable benefits 
of the multilateral WTO forum for trade liberalisation, the rapid increase of North-South bilateral and multilateral Free 
Trade Areas (FTAs) begs a systematic explanation for why some forums are prioritized relative to others. The main aim of 
the article is the presentation of the theory of foreign trade policy and important political and economic interests. The 
article presents the political economy model of the foreign trade policy, protectionistic pressures in different political 
systems, the level of protectionist pressures, food producers pressures, international trade liberalisation and 
environmental protection, the bilateral tendencies in the contemporary foreign trade policy. The main objective of the 
research task is to give a comprehensive analysis of the theory of foreign trade policy in realisation of the important 
political and economic interests. 
2. Method 
Paper prepared in the framework of the Grant OPUS, National Centre of Science –NCS, Nr 
UMO–2013/11/B/HS5/03572. The analyzed problems were solved with the use of qualitative research method. The 
main research method applied in this analysis, was a method of scientific study used for splitting the whole (of individual 
items, their sets, phenomena) by means of logical abstraction. It was also used the analogy (comparative) method, which 
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consists in finding similarities and differences between the items under study, the documentation method. It were applied 
the descriptive method. Additionally, it were used the methods of deductive and inductive forecasting. For the 
presentation of the problem the level of protectionistic pressures was adapted the mathematical model. 
3. Results  
What indicates the importance and innovativeness of the research is the presentation of the new protectionistic tendencies 
and inclination to bilateralizm and regionalizm in the contemporary foreign trade policy. First of all it must underline that 
in the new theoretical terms in the demand for trade policy very important is factor specificity. Some factors are stuck in 
their present uses; therefore, factor returns are not equalized throughout a region’s economy, but are industry specific. 
Trade policy coalitions should form along the lines of exporting versus import-competing industries. It must be emphasis 
that on a theoretical level, understanding the choice of trade policies between liberalizm and protectionisme is very 
important.  
Question is how can we recognise the type of power, the type of rule? First of all, we should investigate what level of 
resources a given government is going to achieve. If an authoritarian government is more or less corrupted than a 
democratic one, it will be creating the income, to a bigger or lesser degree, through protectionism. It will also appropriate 
some part of that income. Secondly, a given type of government may remain under the influence of different pressure 
groups. If an authoritarian government is trying, to some extent, to subordinate special pressure groups including the 
regulated labour sector, it will be, to some extent, generating incomes through protection and it will be turning over some 
part of them to those special pressure groups. 
It should be pointed out that there exists a close relation between democracy and an economic growth, There are well 
known examples of open societies that stimulate the economic growth. This is true mainly in case of highly developed and 
strongly urbanised countries. In the countries with a developed democracy, the pressure groups have a bigger opportunity 
for acting. The research shows that the presence of trade unions helps to accelerate the economic reforms. The benefits 
resulting from liberalisation of the international trade are bigger when the trade unions exist in the sector of the economy 
under protection. The growth of import abilities leads to the decrease of wage pressures, and when the trade unions agree 
to that, such a situation allows for a better allocation of labour force in the economy. This is true both in the case of active 
and passive trade unions, although the effects are better in case of active trade unions. 
The growing interdependence and the decline of USA trade hegemony have led to increased competitiveness and greater 
temptations to resort to strategic trade policy. Trade policy takes on additional importance in economic battle of “the 
valiant liberal reformers, fighting against self-dealing rent seekers profiting from inconsistencies of the transition 
economy”. Many of the clientelist policies that shelter rent seekers are impossible to maintain in the face of competition in 
the international economy. On the other hand, high tariff walls, export licensing, and artificial exchange rates provide 
numerous sources of rents for business people who are trying to promote their own loyalties. 
The reduction or the elimination of trade restrictions stimulates significantly the growth of the world trade exchange, 
while the foreign trade, in turn, is an important factor of the economic growth of individual countries. However it should 
be stressed that free trade in itself is not responsible for economic growth, but more significant are the determining 
macroeconomic stability and increasing investment. 
Reaching the effective agreements on the international trade liberalisation and on environmental protection in the light of 
sustainable development is considered to be both very difficult and very delicate question. The problems of environmental 
protection have become most important issues. Therefore, it is evident that the international market has to take them into 
account. In the context of the sustainable development, the key problem is to make a proper choice: is the introduction of 
restrictions on international trade the best solution, or will the benefits from environmental protection (as applied by a 
multilateral trade system) be higher than the costs? 
It is necessary also to emphasis that if the rules of international trade are clear – and if they are perceived to be supportive 
of important environmental values – then their legitimacy will be much greater. Over the long term, public support for the 
WTO depends on a perception that it is balanced and fair. Efforts to address the issues identified above could greatly 
enhance the WTO’s reputation. Competing trade and environmental principles could best be balanced through creation of 
an interpretive statement that focuses on how the “exceptions” spelled out in Article XX would be implemented, rather 
than through full-blown renegotiation of the environmental elements of the trading system.  
At one end, a multilateral forum with near universal membership offers maximization of gains from trade and reduced 
transaction costs. However, a single state cannot expect to have much control over trade partners or liberalization agendas 
at the multilateral level. At the other end, a bilateral FTA often yields very small gains from trade and usually increases 
transaction costs by producing idiosyncratic sets of rules. But at the same time, a large state can acquire a high level of 
control in terms of partners, issues and agenda selection, and sectoral exclusions or inclusions based on domestic political 
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needs. One can contend that industrialized of aggregate economic gains in the interest of national welfare (largest in 
multilateral forums) or seeking control over rules in line with political interests (greatest in bilateral forums). 
The increase regionalisation of economic cooperation and the bilateral agreements between particular countries is a kind 
of behaviour with which many countries react to the challenges posed by the world economic crisis. Strengthening of 
already existing regional groups like European Union, creating new agreements and new trade blocks causes a specific 
“fragmentarisation” of the global economy. The increase of economic ties between such groups and countries is the effect 
of economic crisis. 
The new trends concern also the common trade policy of the European Union. This has been reflected in the growth of 
bilateral agreements, for example, between the European Union and ASEAN countries and in the proposals for creating a 
transatlantic free trade area between the European Union and the United States of America. In such a situation occurs to 
the liberalisation of trade within the framework of bilateral agreements and in a lesser extent in the framework of the 
multilateral system of international trade of the WTO.  
4. Discussion 
4. 1 Political Economy Model of Foreign Trade Policy  
Traditionally, political economy models of trade policy have tendend to focus on the demand for protection, with factor 
endowments driving political reactions to exposure to international trade. Such model simply assumed that adversely 
affected economic agents would organize to seek protection, which would be afforded to them by their elected 
representatives in the political system. The supply side for trade policy was either ignored or underspecified in most 
model (Thies and Porche, 2007).  
In the new model of the foreign trade policy theory interesting are the reviews of Alt et al. (1996) and Nelson (1988) about 
the demand for trade policy in terms of the theoretical importance of factor specificity (Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik and 
Rogowski, 1996; Nelson, 1988). Factor specificity refers to the ease with which factors (land, labor, and capital) can move 
from one sector to another in an economy. The two dominant approaches to explaining the demand side of trade policy 
used radically differeent assumptions about the specificity of factors. The Heckscher-Ohlin model, used by Rogowski 
(1989) in his seminal contribution “Commers and Coalitions”, assumes very low-factor specificity (Rogowski, 1989). 
The low specificity of factors means that factor returns are equalized throughout a region’s economy. Producers should 
export goods that intensively use their abundant factors and import goods that intensively use their scarce factors, with the 
result that owners of abundant factors will favor free trade and owners of scarce factors will favor protectionisme. Trade 
policy coalitions will therefore be organized along factor or class lines. On the other hand, the Ricardo-Viner assumes that 
some factors are stuck in their present uses; therefore, factor returns are not equalized throughout a region’s economy, but 
are industry specific. Trade policy coalitions should form along the lines of exporting versus import-competing industries. 
Neither of these models explains how preferences over trade policies are actually translated into political action (Alt, 
Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik and Rogowski, 1996). In a discussion of the endogenous tariff literature, Nelson (1988) notes 
that the mobility costs of the specific-factors model may be a result of productivity differentials, labor union activity, or 
individual preferences for membership in a given geografic area, industry, or firm (i.e., some form of solidarity) (Nelson, 
1988). In all of these cases, one can derive a link to preferences for tariff policy, “but without additional information on 
why the specific-factor model is chosen, it does not tell us much about political organisation”. 
Alt et al. (1996) suggest that one can begin to understand this process by assuming that rational individuals make 
cost/benefit calculations (Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik and Rogowski, 1996). The Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner 
models tell us the benefits that individuals hope to recive, but the costs of collective action also intervene as they organize 
to achive those benefits in the political system. Olson (1985) argued that small groups with specialized interests are easier 
to organize and more effective in securing economic rents than large groups with diffuse interests (Olson, 1985). Small 
groups are better able to control free riders than large groups, and groups with specific or homogenous interests can more 
easily coordinate and target their activities than groups with diffuse or heterogenous interests. This approach is thought to 
explain the success of agricultural producer groups in developed countries in organizing for protection as well as the 
inability of agricultural producer group to organize in developing countries (Anderson, 1995; Coleman, 1998; Olson, 
1985; Olson, 1986; Sheingate, 2001). 
However, Nelson (1988) points out that we should not assume that organized interests will be equally responsive to all 
issues (Nelson, 1988). Institutionalized interaction among actors may help to explain systematic patterns of action, 
espacially as institutions created for specific historical purposes may outlive those purposes. Alt et al. (1996) suggest that 
if a particular group has paid the fixed costs of establishing collective action and developed well-worn channels of acces 
to public officials, it may defend its trade policy preferences even when the stakes are low because the marginal costs of 
action are low (Alt, Frieden,Gilligan, Rodrik and Rogowski, 1996). It may be the case that “a much more affected but 
inchoate group does nothing because the start-up costs of organization are too daunting”. Past strength of an organization 
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should therefore be an important intervening variable predicting group action on trade policy. Further, as Nelson (1988) 
argues, once these institutions exist, supply-side interventions may also affect their usefulness as some are deemed 
legitimate or illegitimate aggregators of interest (Nelson, 1988). Thus, we must examine the way in which economic 
institutions and political institutions interact. Most economic models simply assume that a model of the economy is a 
model of the demand side for trade policy, but Nelson (1988) suggests that we must elaborate the mechanismes by which 
demand is articulated to the suppliers of trade policy (Nelson, 1988). For a good overwiew of this argument, especially as 
it pertains to agriculture (Thies and Porche, 2007). 
If the political systems rewards small sectoral groups, than individuals will not pay the costs of organizing large 
intersectoral coalitions. If the political system rewards large mass movements (i.e., majoritarianism), than individuals will 
have to pay the costs of organizing large intersectoral coalitions in order to achive any benefits. Collective action costs 
and political institutions are interactive with factor specifity. They suggest that Rogowski’s (1989) Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework requires low factor specifity, low collective action costs, and domestic political institutions that favor mass 
movements (Rogowski, 1989). The Ricardo-Viner framework used by the endogenous tariff literature requires that 
factors are specific, collection action costs are high, and institutions are less majoritarian, with changes in any of these 
three variables also affecting the typ of coalitions that form. 
In the state as a rational dictator model, the state may be seen as either pursuing “good government” goals along a social 
welfare function or intervening in the economy for their own self- interested model of the state views politicians as 
offering preferential trade policy to economic actors in exchange for political support (Magee, Brock, Young, 1989), 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1984). On the other hand, pluralist theory typically views the state as a neutral aggregator of 
demands from groups in society. The supply of trade policy is then determined by the balance of power on any given issue. 
The supply side of trade policy is relatively undeveloped theoretically, and yet a crucial part of the equation. A variety of 
different characteristics of the political system are posited to affect the supply of trade protectionism, such as politicians 
incentives to cultivate personal votes, the size of electoral districts, party fragmentation, federalism, presidential versus 
parliamentary systems, and so on (Nielson, 2003; Rodrik, 1995; Rogowski, 1987; Rogowski, 1987). 
On a theoretical level, understanding the choice of trade policies in countries is very important. A survey of economists in 
1984 suggested that one of the few things they agreed on was that, under most conditions, tariffs, and quotas reduce the 
general welfare (Frey, 1984). The stubbornness of protectionism in the face of international and academic pressure against 
it has led economists to seek explanations. These explanations range from the simple ignorance of politicians to 
arguments about the rationality of protection for “infant industries” and “optimal tariff levels” in developing states. Faced 
eith this frustrating question, scholars have increasingly turned to political answers in order to explain the choice of what 
would seem to be an “irrational” policy (Frey, 1984; Nau, 1989; Nelson, 1988). 
4. 2 Protectionistic Pressures in Different Political Systems  
It is important to indicate, that the role of trade unions in different political systems may be, to a high degree, different. In 
authoritarian systems it is, as a rule, smaller than in democratic systems. It would seem that if protectionistic pressure on 
the part of trade unions is weaker, the situation for economic growth is much better. Following that line of reasoning we 
could come to conclusion that the authoritarian system is better for the effectiveness of the labour market. The examples 
of Chile, South Korea, Singapore and Turkey from the seventies and early eighties could confirm that point of view. In 
many cases during those two decades the authoritarian regimes persecuted trade unions and put restrictions on basic 
labour rights. During that period of oppression, South Korea, Singapore and Turkey experienced a spectacular growth in 
the sector of processing industry and in the growth of demand for labour. Growing profits and the demand for labour in a 
processing industry, caused a general growth of prosperity of the employed. Although similar results were not noted 
immediately during the authoritarian phase of development in Chile, a number of observers express the opinion that the 
reforms introduced at that time helped to reorganise Chilean economy in the nineties. The application of democratic rules, 
on the other hand, may lead to lower productivity of labour force. In a number of years different democracies had to use 
significant financial resources for the employment of those who belonged to trade unions like for examle in the European 
Union. 
A different point of view says that government legislation concerning the labour market may be applied more effectively 
in an authoritarian system than in a democratic one. The authoritarian regimes often make use of individual interests of 
given circles. In most democratic countries there is no broad enough basis that would allow to use labour market policy for 
gaining the support from pressure groups, the urbanised labour marked elite included. The major difference between 
authoritarian and democratic regimes lies in the level of the outside influence. In a well functioning democracy, the 
outside opinions are also taken into account and there occur some limitations which come from the outside, which restricts 
the achievements of given groups of interest. In a dictatorship, a government cares only that those groups are not too 
strong. 
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There is, however, a number of democracies among the industrialised countries where an effective labour market exists 
(Banerji and Ghanem, 1997). There is also a number of democracies with effective labour market policy among the 
developing countries (Banerji and Ghanem, 1997). Similarly, in the countries in which the transformation from the 
authoritarian regime towards a democracy is taking place, avoiding unfavourable phenomena on a labour market is often 
a priority. For example, the Chilean government moved towards democracy and to free trade unions without home income 
growth. The end of oppression in South Korea, in 1987, started the partnership relations in full of conflicts industry 
(Banerji and Ghanem, 1997). 
 
It is worth considering which of the two points of view presented above should be given support, that is, which of them is 
the proper one. The analysis of that problem may be based on the Grossman and Helpman model (Grossman and Helpman, 
1994). This model describes economic development on the basis of two sectors - urbanised, regulated processing sector, 
and rural, unregulated agricultural sector. The protection of the labour market, especially of minimum wages, is usually 
applied in order to bring the benefits for the employees of the regulated sector, since the sector of unregulated employees 
does not come under the legislation concerning the labour market. 
The sector of regulated employees, and also the owners, demand from the government that it leads an economic policy 
that is favourable to them. The employed demand high minimum wages, while capitalists demand high profits. Both 
groups demand the restrictions on the degree of economy openness. In a closed economy, higher market minimum wages 
and higher profits are usually connected with higher prices for home consumers, and this is not easy when those 
consumers are free to buy the substitutes in form of imported goods. Thus, incomes in an economy may be created by 
protection and later divided among the employees of the regulated sector and the capitalists, although sometimes the 
government itself takes a part of those incomes (Banerji and Ghanem, 1997). 
A government conducting an economic policy takes into account a number of factors. Firstly, it has to decide the degree of 
obtaining the resources, that is, how much from those resources it wants to obtain. Hence the importance of investments 
and of future economic growth, and also of defining the possibilities for keeping the power it is currently holding. 
Secondly, the government should define the scale of support from each of the pressure groups that can influence the 
situation. The position and importance of each group for the development of political processes should be considered. For 
example, in the country where the regulated labour market is divided, and politically weak, only the capitalists may have 
a deciding voice in political processes. And the contrary also happens - in the societies where the labour market is 
organised, it may play the important role in mobilising voters. 
How can we recognise the type of power, the type of rule? First of all, we should investigate what level of resources a 
given government is going to achieve. If an authoritarian government is more or less corrupted than a democratic one, it 
will be creating the income, to a bigger or lesser degree, through protectionism. It will also appropriate some part of that 
income. Secondly, a given type of government may remain under the influence of different pressure groups. If an 
authoritarian government is trying, to some extent, to subordinate special pressure groups including the regulated labour 
sector, it will be, to some extent, generating incomes through protection and it will be turning over some part of them to 
those special pressure groups. 
4.3 Level of Protectionistic Pressures  
The above arguments show that the policy is defined by political factors (including the type of the government and the 
burdens resulting from obligations towards employees and capitalists), and by economical factors (wages, prices, the 
structure of production and consumption). On the basis of the present discussion, we can present two equations, one 
pertaining to the level of protection, and the second pertaining to the national economy and deformation of wages. 
                                                                            1)  = f (e, l, k, R) 
2)  = f1 (, e, l, k, R), 
The level of protection ( depends on the economic parameters (e), a relative political importance of urbanised 
employees and capitalists (l and k, respectively), and on the type of the government (R). Deformation of wages is, on the 
other hand, the function of and of e, l, k and R. In case of a small economy, economic parameters that can influence 
and include flexible consumer and producer prices, demand flexibility, wages and the demand for labour force, and 
also the price of goods on an international market. 
One can expect, a priori, that the growth of  is dependant on l and k. If interest groups become stronger, the pressure to 
form incomes based on protectionism may become stronger. The influence of R, that is, the influence of a political 
authoritarianism on the level of protectionism, that is, , depends on the fact whether the opinion, that the level of 
protectionism depends on the effects of democratisation, is correct. It is also thought that the increase of the deformation 
of wages depends on  and l, while its decrease depends on k. As long as the incomes are obtained from trade protections, 
those incomes can be handed over to urbanised employees. An important problem in case of urbanised labour force as an 
interest group with growing strength is the fact that urbanised employees may gain a big share in the division of incomes 
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but the growth of political importance of the capitalists may cause that the shared incomes, handed over to the labour force 
in regulated sectors of economy will become smaller (Banerji and Ghanem, 1997). 
There is no doubt that it is easier for wealthy rather than poor societies to choose democracy (Helliwel, 1992). Since those 
wealthier societies at the same time have a tendency to a bigger openness, the direction of cause-result events may run 
from the openness of society to the political system, and not, as was suggested earlier, in the opposite direction. The 
research showed also that the level of education plays an important role in this respect. The countries with a higher level of 
education of labour force are more open. 
On the basis of the earlier considerations, one can come to the conclusion that authoritarian systems have a tendency 
towards a broader application of protectionism than democratic systems, and that, in turn, the trade restrictions 
accompany significant deformations of wages on the labour market. This opinion may be justified on the basis of the 
observations of the situation in a number of countries. 
Freedom of association is one of the elements of good management and the necessary condition for development. The 
authoritarian governments do not respect, however, the freedom of association, which is connected with the policy of 
trade restrictions and with the deformations on the labour markets. One cannot state, however, that improper or ineffective 
policy on the labour market belonged exclusively to authoritarian regimes or that authoritarianism automatically 
generates this kind of policy. There is a number of examples of authoritarian countries which do not conduct policies of 
that kind. The works of such authors as Fields or Freeman show that the repressions against the labour force are not 
necessary, if one wants to achieve a required economic growth (Fields, 1994; see also Freeman, 1993).  
Finally, it should be pointed out that there exists a close relation between democracy and an economic growth, There are 
well known examples of open societies that stimulate the economic growth. This is true mainly in case of highly 
developed and strongly urbanised countries. In the countries with a developed democracy, the pressure groups have a 
bigger opportunity for acting. The research shows that the presence of trade unions helps to accelerate the economic 
reforms (Devarajan, Ghanem, Thierfelder, 1997). The benefits resulting from liberalisation of the international trade are 
bigger when the trade unions exist in the sector of the economy under protection. The growth of import abilities leads to 
the decrease of wage pressures, and when the trade unions agree to that, such a situation allows for a better allocation of 
labour force in the economy. This is true both in the case of active and passive trade unions, although the effects are better 
in case of active trade unions. 
The trade unions active on an urbanised labour market had a significant influence on the decisions of governments, in the 
course of multilateral trade negotiations within WTO. It was especially evident in the negotiations on lowering customs 
duties and non-tariff measures in steel, shipbuilding, textile and clothing industries, and in coal mining. In the so-called 
"sensitive" industries, which, for example, in the European Union were under special trade protection, the position of 
trade unions was very strong. 
4.4 Food Producers Pressures  
The biggest conflicts between the United States and the European Union within WTO were caused by agricultural 
problems also during the Doha Round. The governments of the two economic powers were in many times under a very 
strong pressure of food producers, who had problems with the sale of agricultural products surpluses in the situation of the 
shrinking world market and lower prices. 
The problem of liberalisation of agricultural products trading is linked to the problem of subsidies application. According 
to the WTO decisions (art. XVI), exports of the agricultural products, as so-called basic goods, can be subsidised, if this 
fact does not interfere with the economic interests of other participants of the agreement. Actually, subsidising exports of 
agricultural products may have many different forms, starting with a direct subsidy, through variable compensatory fees, 
and finally through various forms of government guarantees and preferential credits. In the ministers declaration we read 
only about a better discipline among the members of WTO. The total prohibition of subsidies would be the simplest 
course, but it does not seem to be realistic my be after 2013. 
In an effort to limit the EU budget expense for subsidising agricultural products, it was decided, among other things, that 
in case of fats, the money will be transferred from the processing sector to the production sector. Instead of compensating 
the industry for higher costs of purchasing more expensive, local raw materials (the prices paid to the growers of rape or 
sunflower in the EU are much higher than the world prices), it was decided that subsidies would go directly to farmers, 
and the size of farms was to be the basis for calculations. At the same time, the Union authorities disclosed that they will 
be trying to reduce gradually those expenses by reducing guaranteed prices.  
This reform was the first in which the attempt was made to eliminate the structural surpluses, the surpluses which had 
been disorganising the EU agricultural market and the international trade for many years. It is worth pointing out here that 
the direct result of announced changes in the agricultural policy of the EU may not be favourable in the abroad. The 
simplest form of compensation for farmers are usually the restrictions for the suppliers from abroad. The agricultural 
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lobby in France is especially active in this area. As a result of its activity and the pressure exerted on the government the 
agricultural goods from abroad have been successfully blocked from the EU market. The position taken by that 
agricultural lobby influenced also the position of the EU representatives in the debates on the agricultural questions during 
the multilateral trade negotiations also in the framework of the Doha Round. 
In spite of the trade conflicts, most clearly visible in the USA - the EU relations, all the countries participating in the 
international trade were interested in the successful of the international trade negotiations. The reduction or the 
elimination of trade restrictions stimulates significantly the growth of the world trade exchange, while the foreign trade, in 
turn, is an important factor of the economic growth of individual countries. 
4.5 International Trade Liberalisation and Environmental Protection  
The tendencies to liberalise the international trade often stand in clear conflict with the protection of the natural 
environment which, during the intensification of production, found itself in the centre of attention. The process of 
pollution was one of the negative results of scientific-technological revolution. Many countries introduced special legal 
regulations in order to protect the environment against pollution. Ecological organisations of different types were 
established, and also the pressure groups, especially in industrialised countries, interested in the use of trade restrictions 
by governments for protection of the environment. 
The pressure groups acting for natural environment protection see the trade policy in two aspects: as the way of 
improvement the standards of environmental protection in individual countries and over their borders, and as the 
instrument for persuading those countries to sign the international agreements on environmental protection. The imports 
restrictions against the producers coming from the countries with low standards of environmental protection may lead to 
the improvement of production standards by the local companies resulting from fighting with low competitiveness, and 
from the attempts to compete with foreign firms (Anderson, 1997). 
The application, in trade policy, of discriminating means in relation to the environment, which happened in the countries 
of western Europe, is in accordance with the article XX of WTO, and it testifies to the fact that trade barriers are used for 
the protection of the environment. Thus, the activities related to environmental protection are in conflict with the 
tendencies leading to international trade liberalisation, and with higher investments. From the theoretical point of view, 
we cannot say that trade liberalisation may help the environmental protection, especially when serious steps have to be 
taken in order to protect this environment against further degradation (Chichilnisky, 1994; see also Copland and Taylor, 
1995; Corden, 1996). On the other hand, when some government find itself in a difficult situation, the trade reforms will 
be much more advantageous for that government than the actions in the environmental protection area (Bhagwati and 
Srinivisan, 1996). That is why the pressure groups connected with the environmental protection are against the 
international trade liberalisation. 
The actions of those groups on WTO forum, and their regional activity against the reduction of trade barriers, have three 
reasons: 1) free trade means the growth of production and income, which, in turn, leads to the degradation of the 
environment, 2) free trade and growing investments cause the growth of transport activity and encourage companies to 
transfer the production to the countries with low ecological standards, which from the environmental point of view is 
wrong, 3) freedom for foreign investments discourage local companies to develop the technologies favourable for 
environmental protection (Anderson, 1997).The question of reaching some form of an agreement between the problems 
of international trade liberalisation and the protection of natural environment especially in the context of the sustainable 
development became an important task for the WTO. The program of WTO activities included: 
 - the relations between the means used in trade and in environmental protection 
 - the relations between multilateral trade systems and the environmental protection means, applied for protection of 
the environment 
 - the influence of the effects of environmental protection on the liberalisation of international trade 
 - the relations between the mechanisms leading to compromises within WTO and within the multilateral agreements 
on environmental protection (Martin and Winters, 1995).  
Reaching the effective agreements on the international trade liberalisation and on environmental protection in the light of 
sustaiable development is considered to be both very difficult and very delicate question. The problems of environmental 
protection have become most important issues. Therefore, it is evident that the international market has to take them into 
account. In the context of the sustainable development, the key problem is to make a proper choice: is the introduction of 
restrictions on international trade the best solution, or will the benefits from environmental protection (as applied by a 
multilateral trade system) be higher than the costs? 
It is necessary also to emphasis that if the rules of international trade are clear – and if they are perceived to be supportive 
of important environmental values – then their legitimacy will be much greater. Over the long term, public support for the 
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WTO depends on a perception that it is balanced and fair (Esty, 1998). Efforts to address the issues identified above could 
greatly enhance the WTO’s reputation. Competing trade and environmental principles could best be balanced through 
creation of an interpretive statement that focuses on how the “exceptions” spelled out in Article XX would be 
implemented, rather than through full-blown renegotiation of the environmental elements of the trading system (Esty, 
2000).  
Finding ways to adress the environmental issues that inescapably arise in the context of deeper economic integration and 
tendency to the sustainable development must be seen as an important trade policy priority, as a matter of WTO 
commitment to undergirding the trade regime with sound economic theory, and as a matter of political necessity. Building 
a trading system that is more sensitive to pollution control and natural resources management issues is mandated by the 
growing degree to which these realms intersect with trade and environmental policies mutually reinforcing are also 
advisable to the extent that the presence of trade rules that internalize externalities will prove to be more economically 
efficient over time. Institutionalizing the links from the trade regime to environmental actors and other elements of civil 
society will also pay dividends. A culture of opennes within the WTO is likely to generate policies that the public accepts 
and that therefore become more useful and durable (Esty, 2000). 
4. 6 Bilateral Tendencies in Contemporary Foreign Trade Policy  
The tendencies in international trade development can create changes in domestic markets, placing pressure on political 
actors to obtain aid from the government. There are also the groups which want to coordinate activities and change foreign 
trade policy. European Commission provide the justification for protection of the internal single market to response to 
global competition. It is important underline that essentially, the government appears to supply protection for affected 
parties; yet, the overall impact on consumers, producers, and foreign competition is neglible (Thies and Porche, 2007). 
Significant government ownership of the productive resources of a country has a negative effect on trade liberalisation, 
while fragmentation of decision-making authority, expressed as fragmentation within the government and pluralism in 
society, has a positive impact on the libaralization of trade policy (Kennedy, 2007). 
In the area of foreign-policy analysis has focused on “three i’s”: interest groups, international structure, and ideas 
(Kennedy, 2007). In the interests groups literature, government policy is viewed as the outcome of competition between 
groups for trade policies that benefit their industry (Nau, 1989; Milner, 1995; Milner and Yoffie, 1989; Schattschneider, 
1935). International structure suggests that freer trade was a reflection on U.S. interests and its hegemonic status after 
World War II, while a decline in free trade is a reflection of the U.S.’s hegemonic decline (Krasner, 1976). The literature 
on ideas suggests that policy belifs are reflected in laws and institutions. These laws and institutions, in turn, carry a type 
of interia that continues to influence policy outcomes long after changes in international and internal structure would 
predict policy change (Goldstein, 1989; Goldstein, 1995). In contrast to these explanations government interests in the 
economy and in maintaining stability also play a large role in trade policy (Kennedy, 2007 ). 
At one end, a multilateral forum like World Trade Organisation (WTO) with near universal membership offers 
maximization of gains from trade and reduced transaction costs. However, a single state cannot expect to have much 
control over trade partners or liberalistion agendas at the multilateral level. At the other end, a bilateral FTA often yields 
very small gains from trade and usually increases transaction costs by producing idiosyncratic sets of rules. But at the 
same time, a large state, can acquire a high level of control in terms of partners, issues and agenda selection, and sectoral 
exclusions or inclusions based on domestic political needs (Pekkanen, Solis, and Katada, 2007). One can contend that 
industrialized of aggregate economic gains in the interest of national welfare (largest in multilateral forums) or seeking 
control over rules in line with political interests (greatest in bilateral forums). 
It is important underline that the liberalizing rules on agriculture, and other less competitive sectors, are no longer an 
acceptable political price for the economic gains bundled across sectors. Yet, this sort of vague statement fosters 
uncertainty for domestic actors at home in uncompetitive sectors like agriculture and in several cases like for exemple in 
European Union and Japan trade officials need to show that they have more concrete control for political reasons-an 
element more credible in a bilateral setting than a multilateral one (Pekkanen, Solis, and Katada, 2007). This situation 
may also indicat the back from globalisation to the mercantilist tendencies in the foreign trade policy. 
5. Conclusion 
The foreign trade policy plays a key role in the maintenance of both economic and political liberalisation. The prominence 
of rent seeking in a country can have far-reaching implication for its economic development. Especially in 
underdeveloped or transitional countries, rent seeking takes scarce resource out of productive areas in the economy, using 
them to promote and/or perpetuate further rents. 
Structural and micro-political economy analyses of foreign trade policy in the context of the sustainable development 
have missed the impact of changing ideas about protectionism and relatively unchanging institutions designed to handle 
domestic producer complaints. The political consensus on the supply of foreign trade policy and protectionism has 
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changed over time. In the economic depression tariffs revenues and protectionism played important roles in the politics of 
political parties. At the same time in the market economy even during the economic depression one can observe a little 
support for liberal foreign trade policy. It is necessary to emphasize that in the foreign trade policy there are not pure 
liberalism and pure protectionism. In the high economic growth there are tendencies to liberalism in foreign trade policy 
and in the economic crisis there are tendencies to protectionism.  
Finding ways to address the environmental issues that inescapably arise in the context of deeper economic integration and 
tendency to the sustainable development must be seen as an important trade policy priority, as a matter of WTO 
commitment to undergirding the trade regime with sound economic theory, and as a matter of political necessity. Building 
a trading system that is more sensitive to pollution control and natural resources management issues is mandated by the 
growing degree to which these realms intersect with trade and environmental policies mutually reinforcing are also 
advisable to the extent that the presence of trade rules. 
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